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Traditionally, the Federal Circuit has deferred to agency discre-
tion in interpreting the antidumping' and countervailing duty laws,
2
but not in interpreting the customs laws.3 Since its creation in 1982,
the Federal Circuit has tested agency interpretations of the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty laws against a standard of "rea-
sonableness;" in practice, that has usually meant deference to the
agencies' interpretations.4 In fact, with respect to interpretations of
* Partner, Stewart and Stewart, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 1982, Washington College of
Law, The American University; B.A., 1979, University of Virginia.
1. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 162, as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1673
(1988).
2. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 151, as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1671
(1988).
3. The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-2613 (1988).
4. See 5 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 29:1, at 332 (2d ed. 1984) (defining
reasonableness standard and describing its application). A 1987 review of Federal Circuit
decisions found that the Federal Circuit did not reverse the Court of International Trade
(ITC) in any case in which the lower court upheld an agency's decision. Barshefsky & Firth,
International Trade Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During the Year
1987, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1988). Similarly, in 1988, several of the most significant
cases decided by the Federal Circuit were based on deference to agency practices. Schroeder,
1093
1094 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 40:1093
the law that it administers, the International Trade Commission
(ITC) has only been reversed by the Federal Circuit in a single case
since 1980.5 Furthermore, the ITC has never lost a challenge under
the substantial evidence standard of review.5
By contrast, the Federal Circuit traditionally and in 1990 has in-
terpreted the customs laws largely without reference to the agency's
interpretation. Surprisingly, in 1990, the Federal Circuit's decisions
with respect to the antidumping and countervailing duty laws sug-
gest a similar "hard look" at agency interpretations of the statutes.7
BetweenJanuary and December 1990, the court decided thirty cases
appealed from the Court of International Trade involving an-
tidumping, countervailing duty, and customs matters. The Court of
International Trade had affirmed the agency in eighteen of the
thirty cases. Of those eighteen cases, however, the Federal Circuit
reversed both the agency and the lower court in six cases. Of the
twelve cases in which the Court of International Trade overturned
the agency, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court and af-
firmed the agency in only three instances.8
Although there are admittedly few cases in 1990 upon which to
base a prediction, it does appear that a trend is emerging in the
court's approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of the
A Review of Selected 1988 International Trade Cases of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 1191, 1209, 1215, 1222 (1989).
5. In 1986, the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the CIT overturning the Interna-
tional Trade Commission's (ITC) interpretation of the cumulation statute. Bingham & Taylor
v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482, 1484-87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (invalidating ITC decision not to
cross-cumulate dumped imports with subsidized imports as inconsistent with legislative intent
of antidumping statute).
6. See generally Tardon Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring that appellate review of ITC determinations apply "substantial
evidence" standard); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1988) (stating in pertinent part, "The court
shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found ... (B) ... to be unsup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
7. A "hard look" approach was originally coined to describe the level ofjudicial scru-
tiny applied by the D.C. Circuit in the 1970s. See generally Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (findingjudicial scrutiny of FCC licensing deci-
sion showed reasonable supervisory vigilance and was necessary to ensure that agency took
"hard look" at issues presented), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (invalidating administrative
decision made by Secretary of Agriculture based on his failure to include adequate informa-
tion or evidentiary justification); DAViS, supra note 4, § 29:1, at 335-36 (describing varying
applications of "hard look" doctrine); Note, Deregulation and Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT.
REV. 177, 210-12 (1983) (claiming hard look review was designed to create highly structured
decision making in order to avoid political considerations).
8. See generally Appendix (listing international trade decisions by court between January
I and November 30, 1990, and indicating in each case whether agency was overturned by CIT
and whether decision withstood appeal). It should be noted that appeals from decisions of
the ITC under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (amended as section 1482(d)), are taken
directly to the Federal Circuit and do not involve review by the CIT. There were only four
such appeals decided during 1990. The agency prevailed in three of the four cases.
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international trade statutes. There are sound policy reasons, em-
bodied in the legislative history of each statute, for the court to take
a harder look. Not the least of these are the emerging indications
that the Commerce Department in particular intends to speed up its
own review process, potentially at the expense of fairness in its re-
sults. The court in the 1990s should fulfill its role as it was intended
by Congress and it should provide the lower court with express gui-
dance concerning the standard of judicial scrutiny that is to be
employed.
I. DEFERENCE IN INTERPRETING THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS BUT NOT
THE TARIFF SCHEDULES
In the past, the Federal Circuit applied a highly deferential ap-
proach to administrative interpretations under Tide VII of the Tariff
Act of 1930.9 Even before the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council 10 held that agency interpretations
should be measured against a "reasonableness" standard," the
Federal Circuit had applied a very deferential standard of review.
For example, in Smith-Corona Group v. United States,12 the Federal Cir-
cuit found that the antidumping law "does not expressly limit the
exercise of the Secretary's authority ... nor does it include precise
standards or guidelines to govern the exercise of that authority."'
3
In addition, although recognizing that the statute "places primary
reliance" on value-based adjustments, the court upheld the Secre-
tary's interpretation of a regulation that reduced value to a secon-
dary consideration. "
4
In Smith-Corona and subsequent cases, the court also applied a lib-
9. 5 D~vis, supra note 4, § 29.27, at 459 (describing judicial "deference" and "great
deference" to agency decisions over last 100 years).
10. 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
11. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44,
reh 'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (upholding Environmental Protection Agency interpretation
of regulation as reasonable reading of statutory language). The Chevron court set forth a
three-part standard of review: First, if Congress has specifically considered the question at
issue in the statute, the court's inquiry ends. Second, if Congress failed to address the issue,
or if its intent appears ambiguous or inadequate, the court must evaluate whether the
agency's interpretation is reasonable when considered in light of the statute's language, pur-
pose, and legislative history. Third, if the court finds the agency's interpretation is reason-
able, it must be upheld even if the court could have come to a contrary conclusion. Id. at 843;
see also Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986) (providing
additional detail regarding deference principle and role of Chevron in changing standard of
appellate review).
12. 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
13. Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that while interpretation of statute made by Secretary of Commerce is not entitled to
degree of "heightened deference" suggested by CIT, Secretary is entitled to broad discretion
and deference to that discretion), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
14. Id. at 1577 (stating that while statutory language places greatest emphasis on value in
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eral "abuse of discretion" test to the agency determinations.1 5 In
1985, in the complicated area of adjustments to the antidumping
duty calculation, which was the subject of Smith-Corona, the court in
Consumer Products Division v. United States 16 stated that the administer-
ing agency, in this case, the Commerce Department, was the
"master of the subject."'17 In 1986, in American Lamb Co. v. United
States,'8 the Federal Circuit expressly adopted the approach of the
Supreme Court in Chevron, holding that a "court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation."' 9
Consistent with this precedent, in 1990, the Federal Circuit, upon
identifying a congressional delegation of authority to an agency,
such as the ITC, deferred to the agency interpretations of the Tariff
Act of 1930. Thus, for example, in Avesta AB v. United States, 20 the
court affirmed the decision of the International Trade Commission
not to initiate a review of the antidumping duty order on Swedish
stainless steel plate on the grounds that Congress had delegated the
decision to initiate such review to the Commission. 21 The court re-
lied upon the absence of any specific standard in the statute for the
initiation of review and the lack of any guidance for the Commission
in the legislative history.22 This approach follows the formula of
Smith-Corona and of Chevron.
23
Similarly, in reviewing the Customs Service's construction of the
adjusting antidumping duties, Secretary did not abuse authority by relying primarily on cost
to make adjustments).
15. In Smith-Corona, the court found that the statute gave discretion to the agency and
that the Commerce Department "did not abuse that discretion," even though its regulation
achieved the opposite effect intended by the statutory language. Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at
1577; see also Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1313-18 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (reaffirming International Trade Administration interpretation of countervailing duty
statute as reasonable assessment of intent and language of statute); Melamine Chems., Inc. v.
United States, 732 F.2d 924, 928 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding Commerce Department inter-
pretation of anti-dumping statute).
16. 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
17. Consumer Prods. Div. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1033, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quot-
ing National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)) (stating that
judicial review of International Trade Administration determinations should give "considera-
ble deference" to specialized knowledge of agencies).
18. 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
19. American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 832, 843 (1984)) (stat-
ing that reviewing court should only reject agency interpretation of statute if found to be
insufficient or unreasonable).
20. 914 F.2d 233 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
21. See id. at 236-38 (stating that agency authority to make individual case determinations
was neither "arbitrary and capricious" nor an "abuse of discretion").
22. Id at 236 (finding no language in statute that was "plain" in addressing question
presented, but finding intention to allow agency discretion in administering law in legislative
history).
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing Smith-Corona's holding that Sec-
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administrative provisions included in section 140la(b)(4)(A) of the
Tariff Act of 1930,24 the Federal Circuit in Generra Sportswear Co. v.
United States 25 found the issue to be whether Customs' interpretation
was "sufficiently reasonable." 26 Under this standard, the court de-
ferred to Customs' construction and reversed the Court of Interna-
tional Trade.2 7 The court found that the question presented,
whether quota charges were dutiable, was not expressly addressed
in the statute.28 In Generra, in order to defer to the agency's con-
struction, the court had to distinguish its own precedent, a 1967 de-
cision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
29
On the other hand, traditionally in interpreting the tariff sched-
ules, the court has not deferred to Customs' construction. For ex-
ample, in Richards Medical Co. v. United States,30 the court succinctly
stated that to decide a question of statutory construction, "we start
first with the plain meaning of the statute, and then go to other ex-
trinsic aids such as legislative history if necessary." 31 The court did
not discuss whether the absence of "plain language" constituted an
implicit delegation to the agency to interpret the statute in the first
instance. 32 Nor did the court address whether the Customs Service
retary of Commerce is entitled to broad discretion); supra note 11 and accompanying text
(discussing the standards for review under Chevron).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(4)(A) (1982).
25. 905 F.2d 377 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
26. Generra Sportswear Co. v. United States, 905 F.2d 377, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing
Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm'n, 454 U.S. 27, 39
(1981)).
27. Id. at 379 (holding that because statutory construction applied by Customs was per-
missible interpretation, it must be upheld).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 380-81 (holding quota charges not dutiable on ground that "transaction value"
under section 1401a could reasonably be interpreted in different manner than "export value"
under pre-1979 statute). The court distinguished United States v. Getz Bros. & Co., 55
C.C.P.A. 11, 15 (1967) (appraising merchandise on basis of "export value" only).
30. 910 F.2d 828 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
31. Richards Medical Co. v. United States, 910 F.2d 828, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing
Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (analyzing con-
gressional intent and meaning of statutory language without any reference to whether Cus-
toms' interpretation was "reasonable"). Indeed, conceding that there were many dictionary
definitions of the key statutory term, the court did not ask whether Customs' definition was a
reasonable one, but instead queried: "Which definition best invokes the intent of Congress?"
Id. at 830. See also Eastalco Aluminum Co. v. United States, 916 F.2d 1568, 1569-71 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (applying rules of statutory construction, finding no express language in the statute,
and resorting to legislative history to gauge meaning of "substantially crystalline" as used in
tariff schedules).
32. See Richards Medical, 910 F.2d at 830 (interpreting statutory language without ad-
dressing whether agency's authority to interpret was permissible); see also Avesta A.B., 914 F.2d
at 236-38 (finding absence of specific language implicitly gives ITC right to make reasonable
interpretations on a case-by-case basis); Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1571 (holding that absent
explicit rules, assessment of statutory language and legislative intent enable agency to make
reasonable determinations).
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interpretation was a reasonable one, even though the court could
interpret the statute differently.33
II. A HARDER LOOK AT TRADE CASES
In 1990, the Federal Circuit did not uniformly defer to the Com-
merce Department or International Trade Commission. In some
cases, the court stated the question presented without reference
either to Smith-Corona, to Chevron, or to whether an agency determi-
nation was "reasonable."
In Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v. United States3 4 and U. H. F. C. Co. v. United
States,35 two cases involving imported animal glue, the court was
faced with a question of statutory interpretation involving the use of
"best information available."3 6 Section 776 of the Tariff Act of
1930 provides that the Commerce Department may use the "best
information otherwise available" whenever a party "refuses or is un-
able to produce information requested." 37 In both cases, the Fed-
eral Circuit found that the foreign glue manufacturers had not
refused to supply information. Rather, the court found that the par-
ties were unable to submit information because the agency did not
ask the right questions in a timely manner.38 As a result, the court
refused to allow the Commerce Department the discretion to use
the "best information available" in a manner that would protect the
domestic industry by maintaining a higher dumping margin.3 9
In prior cases in which the Federal Circuit deferred to the agency,
the lack of explicit statutory directions was crucial. In this case, the
statute on its face, did not address what information constituted the
"best information" or the extent of agency discretion when informa-
tion was not submitted or available. 40 From a policy standpoint, the
court in Olympic Adhesives and U.H.F.C. ignored the agency deadlines
and the interests of the United States industry protected by the an-
tidumping laws. Given a statutory scheme that contemplates annual
reviews and regulations that require reviews to be completed within
33. See Richards Medical, 910 F.2d at 830 (upholding C.I.T. interpretation of statute with-
out commenting on reasonableness of determination made by Customs); see also Consumer
Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1039 (stating "it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpreta-
tion of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which tile court
views as the most reasonable").
34. 899 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
35. 916 F.2d 689 (Fed: Cir. 1990).
36. Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
U.H.F.C. Co. v. United States, 916 F.2d 689, 691 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1982).
38. OlympicAdhesives, 899 F.2d at 1571; U.H.F.C., 916 F.2d at 696-702.
39. Olympic Adhesives, 899 F.2d at 1571; U.H.F.C., 916 F.2d at 696-702.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1982).
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one year of their initiation,4 ' Olympic Adhesives and U.H.F.C. effec-
tively prevented the Commerce Department from resorting to the
"best information available" when it realized late in an administra-
tive review that the data submitted did not address fundamental is-
sues.42 In such circumstances, the court was unwilling to permit the
Commerce Department to use "best information available" even if
there was no time to solicit additional data from the foreign pro-
ducer and without regard for the domestic industry also party to the
proceeding.
43
This view of the "best information" rule diverges from the earlier
holding of the Federal Circuit in Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States.
44
In that case, the court interpreted the "best information" rule in the
context of statutory deadlines and required the agency to resort to
the "best information" in order to meet its statutory deadline.45 To
the extent that the need for a timely determination left unanswered
questions, the court in Atlantic Sugar suggested that when there is
not substantial evidence on the record, the proper approach is to
remand the determination for further development of the record.
46
This approach, however, must not prevent the agency from relying
upon "best information available" adverse to the foreign manufac-
turer.47 Given that the purpose of the law is to protect domestic
industry from unfair trade, 48 and given that the agency should
41. In practice, the Commerce Department has failed in many cases to complete its "an-
nual" reviews on time. See Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 52 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988). However, the goal of the regulations is to improve the agency's past performance and
eliminate the backlog of unfinished cases. 19 C.F.R. § 353.22(c)(7) (1990) (providing that
reviews will be completed within 365 days).
42. See Olympic Adhesives, 899 F.2d at 1574 (resting decision solely on statutory language
regarding noncompliance with information request, without regard for underlying policy im-
plications); U.H.F.C., 916 F.2d at 701 (defining similarly narrow agency authority by restrict-
ing International Trade Administration from using "best information" available when party is
unable to provide information in accordance with statute, as excessive extension of its
authority).
43. See U.H.F.C., 916 F.2d at 701 (finding International Trade Administration notjusti-
fied in turning to "best information" rule).
44. 744 F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (requiring that ITC make determinations based
on "best information available" rule as mandated by statute).
45. Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting
use of term "shall" means that ITC must rely on "best information" to avoid delay in
investigation).
46. Id. at 1561-62 (stating that entire record should be taken into consideration to deter-
mine substantiality of evidence).
47. Id. (finding that when evidence on record is inadequate to make injury determina-
tion, rather than barring use of "best information," substantial evidence standard should be
invoked to obtain information needed to serve as basis for conclusions).
48. See, e.g., Bomont Indus. v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 958,962 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989)
(noting that purpose of antidumping law is "remedial" in nature); Badger-Powhatan v. United
States, 608 F. Supp. 653, 656 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (finding antidumping law "was designed
to protect domestic industry from sales of imported merchandise at less than fair value which
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render its determinations on time,49 where necessary data are not
available in the administrative record late in the proceeding, the ab-
sence of adequate information justifies resort to "best
information." 50
Indeed, in Rhone-Poulenc v. United States,5' the Federal Circuit up-
held the agency's reliance on the "best information" on the ground
that "[t]he agency's approach fairly places the burden of production
on the importer, which has in its possession the information capable
of rebutting the agency's inference [that the company was dumping
at the highest prior margin]." 52 Moreover, the court reached this
conclusion after noting that the agency's regulations allow the
agency to take into account the fact that a party refused to supply
information. 53 The Federal Circuit also stated that a "permissible"
agency interpretation of the statute must be upheld, "unless Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."5 4 The
Federal Circuit's willingness in Olympic Adhesives and U.H.F. C. to sec-
ond-guess the agency as to the "best information available" without
express statutory language to the contrary or specific guidance in
the legislative history is thus a notable departure from the court's
prior approach.
The court's 1990 decision in LMI-La Metalli Industriale, S.P.A. v.
United States55 also departed from the standard of deference to
agency interpretations with respect to technical adjustments to the
calculation of dumping margins. The question presented in LMI in-
volved the calculation of so-called "imputed credit costs."5 6 This
either caused or threatened to cause injury"); H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60
(1979) (stating purpose of statute was to bolster and protect domestic industry).
49. See Atlantic Sugar, 744 F.2d at 1560 n.14 (referencing policy efforts by Congress to
accelerate investigatory process) (citing S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 75, reprinted in
1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 461).
50. As noted by the Federal Circuit in Atlantic Sugar: "One may as well view the ("best
information"] rule, in light of the legislative history cited, as a club over the ITC's head, which
Congress has brandished to force that agency to arrive at some determination within the time
allotted." 744 F.2d at 1560.
51. 899 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
52. Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (cit-
ing Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d at 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
53. Id. at 1191.
54. Id. at 1190 n.9 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)) (noting that reasonable interpretations of statutes by agencies
must be upheld unless Congress specifically and unambiguously defines and resolves exact
problem presented).
55. 912 F.2d 455 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
56. LMI-La Metalli Industriale, S.P.A. v. United States, 912 F.2d 455, 460 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (discussing petitioners' claim that imputation of credit cost was erroneously assessed).
Imputed credit cost is a function of the number of days that credit is extended and the appro-
priate interest rate. See UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STUDY OF ANTIDUMPING
ADJUSTMENTS METHODOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY CHANGE 47-50 (1985).
The adjustment is not identified in the statute, but has been followed for several years. Id.
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calculation is one of the adjustments that the Federal Circuit ad-
dressed in Smith-Corona and Consumer Products, in which the court de-
ferred to the agencies as "masters of the subject. '57 In LMI,
however, the court did not defer to the agency's application of its
own rule or to its analysis of the record. Instead, the court invoked
the undefined concept of "reasonable commercial behavior" as the
basis for overturning the agency action.5
8
The antidumping statute provides that when comparing home
market and United States prices, the Commerce Department may
make allowances for "differences in circumstances of sale."59 Such
allowances are to be made if "established to the satisfaction of the
administering authority." 60 In prior cases, the court invoked this
language to justify deference to agency interpretation and the in-
vestment of broad discretionary authority in the agency, 61 yet in
LMI, the court did not defer to the agency. LMI involved adjust-
ments to the foreign market value for credit costs. The Commerce
Department used the Italian interest rate to calculate the cost of
credit to the Italian producer, despite evidence that the Italian pro-
ducer had obtained dollar-denominated loans during the period at
lower interest rates. 62 The Court of International Trade had held
that the Commerce Department correctly presumed that an Italian
company would obtain credit in Italy to finance its sales, including
its United States receivables. 65 Notably, this construction was con-
sistent with prior case law recognizing that respondents seek to min-
imize the margin of dumping and therefore have the burden of
proving the entitlement to adjustments that reduce that margin.6
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the Commerce Depart-
ment's approach on this technical issue, finding that "reasonable
57. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's deference
to agency expertise in these cases).
58. LMI-La Metalli Industriale, S.P.A. v. United States, 912 F.2d 455, 460-61 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (requiring that credit cost be imputed on "basis of usual and reasonable commercial
behavior" in order "to conform with commercial reality," and ruling that borrowing money at
twice the available rate was not "reasonable commercial behavior").
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (1988).
60. Id.; see also 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a) (presenting regulation pertinent to "circumstance
of sale" adjustments).
61. See Smith-Corona, supra note 12, at 1573 & n.11 (citing language of statute as giving
discretion to agency); Consumer Products, supra note 16, at 1037-38 (discussing agency interpre-
tation of statute as determinative).
62. LMI, 912 F.2d at 460 (discussing whether imputed credit costs were calculated
correctly).
63. See LMI-La Metalli Industriale, S.P.A. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 959, 969 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1989) (finding Commerce Department's use of Italian short term rate in calculat-
ing credit cost supported by administrative record and in accord with law).
64. See Timken Co. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 495, 513 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (find-
ing it reasonable to place burden on party seeking adjustment because that party has incentive
to withhold information).
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commercial behavior" dictated the use of a dollar-denominated in-
terest rate.65 Given that the "imputed credit cost" was an adjust-
ment created by the Commerce Department pursuant to section
1677b(a)(4) and that the statute permits such adjustments "to the
satisfaction of" that agency, the court's scrutiny of the agency's pre-
sumption differs from the approach in Smith-Corona and its progeny.
Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States,66 a case
filed in 1989 and argued on June 4, 1990, illustrates the Federal
Circuit's lack of deference to an agency regulation that was adopted
to implement a 1984 statutory change. 67 Asociacion Colombiana in-
volved a recurrent problem in antidumping duty cases, caused by
the fact that after an antidumping duty order is issued, the statute
contemplates an annual review of the order upon request.68 If a
party appealed the original antidumpirig order and the court action
is pending at the time to request the first review, the question arises
whether the party must request an administrative review to preserve
its ability to obtain the benefits of a successful court challenge. 69
The Court of International Trade split on this question.70 Some
judges held that the litigant must request a review or face automatic
liquidation of its entries under the Commerce Department regula-
tions.71 Otherjudges held that injunctive relief was available to pre-
65. See LMI, 912 F.2d at 460 (concluding that International Trade Administration's use
of lira denominated interest rate was not supported by evidence).
66. 916 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
67. See Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 916 F.2d
1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that government's reliance on own regulation was
"misplaced" as regulation was not intended to cover case at bar).
68. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (1988) (providing for administrative review of outstanding
antidumping duty order only if requested). Prior to 1984, annual reviews of such orders were
automatic. See Asociacion Colombiana, 916 F.2d at 1576 (discussing legislative history of annual
review of antidumping orders).
69. Because appeals frequently take several years, and on average take well over one
year, this situation arises frequently. See generally Shambon, Accomplishing the Legislative
Goals for the Court of International Trade: More Speedl More Speedl (presented during the
Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of International Trade, November 3, 1989)
(showing that median length of time from filing action to first decision on merits by CIT was
22 months).
70. See Cambridge Lee Indus., Inc. v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 1518, 1520 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1989) (noting split of authority in CIT as to "whether a party must request an annual
administrative review in order to obtain an injunction against liquidation"), appeal dismissed,
916 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
71. See, e.g., Cambridge Lee, 723 F. Supp. at 1519-20 (affirming view that failure to follow
administrative review procedures did not establish irreparable injury to plaintiff seeking in-
junction to prevent automatic liquidation of entries); NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States,
701 F. Supp. 226, 227 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (upholding view that injunctive relief should not
be granted since plaintiff did not use administrative relief; Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United
States, 669 F. Supp. 437, 439 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs
because they had not chosen to participate in administrative review), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d
1101 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
"Liquidation of entries" is the process by which imports undergo final agency action.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 809-10 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Once the "entry"
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vent the agency from liquidating the entries and undermining the
original appeal.7 2 Although the regulation was reasonably contem-
poraneous with the statutory amendment and had been upheld by a
three-judge panel of the Court of International Trade,73 the Federal
Circuit disagreed with the Commerce Department's position and
did not address the regulation in terms of its "reasonableness." 74
The statute itself does not address this issue. Although the court
did not find the legislative history to be specifically on point, it did
rely on the intent of Congress to reduce the burdens on the
agency.75 Under similar circumstances, the court in prior decisions
had held that the agency's interpretation "need not be the only rea-
sonable interpretation, ' 76 and had declined to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency. 77 In Asociacion Colombiana, however, the
is "liquidated," the amount of antidumping duty assessed cannot be refunded or increased by
court order. Id. Under the Commerce Department regulation at issue in Asociacion Colombi-
ana, imports under an antidumping duty order would have been liquidated by virtue of the
plaintiffs' failure to request an administrative review, even though a court challenge was pend-
ing to determine the correctness of the antidumping duty order. Absent a request for review,
entries of imported merchandise subject to an antidumping duty order are subject to the
assessment of duties "at rates equal to the cash deposit of, or bond for, estimated antidump-
ing duties." 19 C.F.R. § 353.22(e)(1) (1990). To prevent such final action, the regulations
required the litigants to request an administrative review. Id.
72. See, e.g., Sonco Steel Tube Div., Ferrum Inc. v. United States, 698 F. Supp. 927, 928
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (stating view that injunctive relief may be granted); Ipsco Inc. v. United
States, 692 F. Supp. 1368, 1371-73 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (claiming that it was unnecessary for
plaintiff to have pursued administrative relief in order to seek judicial review); Oki Elec. In-
dus. Co. v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 480, 485-86 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (finding regulation
requiring request inapplicable because of congressional intent to avoid unnecessary reviews).
73. See Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 437,439 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987)
(upholding "statutory scheme" and stating that plaintiff was not contesting "the validity of the
regulation" nor lack of adequate notice under regulation).
74. See Asociadon Colombiana, 916 F.2d at 1576 (finding Commerce Department's reliance
on regulation to be "misplaced").
75. Id Paradoxically, as a result of the court's construction, it is likely that the agency's
burdens will be increased. First, customs will now have to recalculate the appropriate duty
rates to be assessed on entries where no annual review was requested whenever an appeal of
the antidumping duty order retroactively changes the estimated duty rate that was paid on
entry. Second, whenever an appeal is pending, domestic interested parties will now lack cer-
tainty with regard to the duty deposit rate and will have an irresistible incentive to request
annual reviews in order to protect against a lowering of the antidumping duty rates as a result
of the court appeal.
76. See Consumer Prod. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., 753 F.2d 1033, 1039 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (finding it "a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute
need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which the court views as the most
reasonable") (emphasis in original); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (con-
cluding that judicial role in scrutinizing agency rule "begins and ends with assuring that the
Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to implement the congressional mandate
in some reasonable manner"); see also Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534-36 (1978)
(accepting "logical force of petitioner's argument" regarding interpretation of statute, but
finding that issue was not how court would resolve ambiguity in statute but whether regula-
tion was reasonable).
77. See Consumer Prod. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., 753 F.2d 1033, 1038-40
(discussing level of deference to agency's interpretation of regulation); Smith-Corona Group
v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that "Secretary of Commerce
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court did not analyze the regulation's "reasonableness." Instead,
the court disagreed with the agency's interpretation of its own regu-
lation and, further, found that the regulation was not intended to
address the situation.7 8 In fact, the court recast the inquiry in terms
of the authority of the courts to issue injunctions.79 Thus, the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade's decisions
that had deferred to the agency interpretation but did not explain
why deference to the agency interpretation was inappropriate or
why a "reasonableness" analysis was inapt.
In Ipsco, Inc. v. United States,80 the Federal Circuit also abandoned a
deferential approach to agency action in its review of a significant
issue in countervailing duty law. In Ipsco, the court considered
whether the International Trade Administration could establish an
estimated duty deposit rate for subsidized imports from a given
country by reference to the weighted-average net subsidy for com-
panies receiving subsidies, i.e., excluding from the average duty de-
posit rate those companies that did not receive any subsidies.8' The
Federal Circuit began its analysis by stating that it would "give due
has been entrusted with responsibility of implementing the antidumping law" and "has broad
discretion" in its execution).
78. See Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 916 F.2d
1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding regulation to be directed toward situation where an-
tidumping order is accepted by both parties and amount of duty is not challenged, and not
situation at bar where petitioner failed to request annual review and is seeking to enjoin liqui-
dation in suit). The language of the regulation, however, is not so limiting. See supra note 71
(outlining regulation at issue which provides for assessment of duties when "timely request"
has not been received). Furthermore, the court does not expressly confront the fact that the
agency has interpreted its own regulation differently. Compare Asociacion Colombiana, 916 F.2d
at 1576 (noting government's reliance on regulation but not discussing level of deference to
agency interpretation) with Consumer Products, 753 F.2d at 1039 (referring to agency as "mas-
ters" of the subject in determining reasonableness of regulation).
79. Asociacion Colombiana, 916 F.2d at 1578 (finding no "abuse of discretion" by agency in
granting injunction). Even in its analysis of the equity authority of the courts, however, the
Federal Circuit departed from a deferential approach, rejecting the agency's "narrow" con-
struction without the support of any statutory language or legislative history. Id. at 1577
(finding no reason to give narrow meaning to statute as ascribed by government). Although
the agency argued in essence that the CIT lacked jurisdiction over the entries for which no
review was requested, the court did not address the jurisdictional issue and held only that the
CIT's injunctive powers were "broad." Id. (arguing that "statute broadly empowers" CIT to
enjoin liquidation of entries covered by administrative determinations).
80. 899 F.2d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
81. Ipsco, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1192, 1193-94 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In Ipsco, eleven
Canadian producers of oil country tubular goods were under investigation by the Interna-
tional Trade Administration (ITA). Of the eleven companies, eight reported receiving no
subsidies, one reported de minimis subsidies, one did not respond, and Ipsco itself reported
subsidies amounting to less than one percent. Id. at 1193. Based on verification of these
responses, ITA issued negative determinations, excluding the eight companies not subsidized
and the one company that received de minimis subsidies from the countervailing duty order.
Id. at 1193-94. With respect to Ipsco, the company that did not respond, and any future
exporters not identified, ITA issued an affirmative determination and set the rate for esti-
mated duties equal to Ipsco net benefit. Id.
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weight to the agency's interpretation of the statute. '8 2 The court
went on to find that "[n]either the countervailing duty statute nor
the applicable regulations... specifically state how a 'net subsidy' is
calculated."8 3 Then, the court reviewed both consistent and incon-
sistent agency precedents. 84 At this point, a deferential Chevron ap-
proach would have permitted the court to affirm the agency's
interpretation as a reasonable one. The fact that the agency had
taken different approaches in various cases and had been affirmed
by the Court of International Trade indicated that reasonable peo-
ple could reach different conclusions regarding the same issue.8 5
Therefore, had the court followed a deferential approach, it would
not have substituted its judgment for that of the agency.
The Federal Circuit, however, found that congressional intent was
to create a presumption that countervailing duty rates should be ap-
plied country-wide. 86 The court mentioned Congress' intent to pro-
vide relief to injured domestic industries from subsidized
merchandise and its condemnation of unfair trade.87 But, under the
court's holding, a single company or a small number of companies
subsidized by a foreign government will escape the countervailing
duty law to the extent that there are other exporters who do not
receive subsidies and whose exports sufficiently dilute the country-
wide average net subsidy. The court did not reconcile this result
with its citation of congressional intent to discourage injurious sub-
82. Id. at 1194-95 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,450 (1978)).
The court further stated that it could "not sustain the ITA's exercise of administrative discre-
tion if it contravene[d] statutory objectives." Id. at 1195.
83. Id. at 1195 (outlining provisions of applicable regulations).
84. Id. at 1196-97 (finding it apparent "that the ITA has no consistent method for calcu-
lating the net subsidy when there are both producers and exporters receiving a non-de
minimis subsidy and others that receive no subsidy or only a de minimis subsidy").
85. Compare Cementos Anahauc del Golfo, S.A. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1558, 1568
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (concluding that ITA exclusion of de minimis rates was not erroneous),
rev'd on other grounds, 879 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1989) with Fabricas El Carmen, S.A., de C.V. v.
United States, 672 F. Supp. 1465, 1478-79 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (arguing that country-wide
rates should include excluded firms).
86. Ipsco, 899 F.2d at 1197 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1988) and stating that
"countervailing duty orders presumptively apply to all merchandise of such kind or class ex-
ported from the country investigated"). Notably, the cited language does not necessarily
mean that all imports of subsidized merchandise should pay the same countervailing duty. It
may simply be interpreted to mean that all subsidized imports from that country should be
covered by the countervailing duty order.
87. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting that intent of statute is remedial).
Congressional intent to provide strong enforcement of trade laws has been stated repeatedly.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 317,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1979) (intending to increase enforce-
ment of antidumping laws through allocation of resources "to ensure vigorous administra-
tion"); H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) (explaining that antidumping laws
are important "because they offset and deter predatory dumping"); S. REP. No. 71, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1987) (revising antidumping and countervailing duty laws "to improve
their effectiveness").
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sidization s8 The court based its conclusion upon the absence of
statutory language, inconsistent agency precedent, and inconsistent
legislative history. Yet, it did so without application of Chevron.
III. A PRINCIPLED BASIS FOR CLOSER SCRUTINY
Because in 1990 the Federal Circuit did not consistently follow
Chevron, Smith-Corona, and Consumer Products in reviewing agency in-
terpretations of the unfair trade laws,89 the lower court is without
clear guidance regarding the appropriate degree of deference it
should employ. Professor Davis has summarized the state of admin-
istrative law decisions by the Supreme Court in a manner that is apt
here: "The law is not that courts use a reasonableness test in re-
viewing administrative determinations of questions of law, and the
law is not that courts substitute judgment on such determinations;
the law is that courts have discretionary power either to use a rea-
sonableness test or to substitute judgment." 90 The Federal Circuit's
1990 decisions fall into both categories: some cite Smith-Corona and
Chevron and defer to agency interpretations of statutes,!"' others cite
to "plain language" and congressional intent, and interpreting the
statute de novo. 92
In the area of interpretation of the tariff schedules, the lack of
deference to agency interpretation and the uniform absence of cita-
tion to cases such as Chevron reflect the longstanding approach of
the Federal Circuit and its predecessors. 93 Richards Medical and Eas-
88. Ipsco, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1192, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that une-
qual application of statute did not advance congressional intent to protect against unfair trade
practices).
89. See Appendix (compiling status of 1990 trade cases). The Federal Circuit upheld
agency action in 15 of 30 cases which came to it through the CIT (it upheld the ITC in three
of four cases directly appealed from that agency).
90. D~vis, supra note 4, § 29:16 at 402 (discussing judicial deference to agency interpre-
tations of law).
91. See, e.g., Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industriais and FNV-Veiculos E Equipa-
mentos S.A. v. United States, 913 F.2d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting obligation of court
"to give deference to an agency acting within its scope of responsibility"); Generra Sports-
wear Co. v. United States, 905 F.2d 377, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that agency interpreta-
tion of facially unclear statute will be upheld if reasonable); Chapparal Steel Co. v. United
States, 901 F.2d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing Chevron deference principles).
92. See, e.g., Eastalco Aluminum Co. v. United States, 916 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (looking at plain meaning of terms and legislative history in construing statute);
Hoechst Akhengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (giving no deference
to agency interpretation of statute because it was inconsistent with congressional intent);
Richards Medical Co. v. United States, 910 F.2d 828, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that
defining "therapeutic" was not resolved by accepting Custom's definition, but by ascertaining
Congressional intent).
93. In customs law cases, the Federal Circuit generally adheres to the precedents of the
Court of Customs Appeals and the CCPA. For example, in deciding Tropicana Products, Inc.
v. United States, 909 F.2d 504 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the court relied upon a 1907 decision of the
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talco Aluminum Co. v. United States94 are in accord with traditional
principles of statutory interpretation and the standard of review that
is applied in customs matters. 95 When faced with a question of stat-
utory interpretation, however, the deferential standard applied to
factual questions in customs cases is not apparently relevant. In-
deed, in customs cases, there is a presumption of correctness that
attaches to the agency's classification. 96 It is not logical, then, to
apply a more deferential standard of review where the question is
whether an agency construction of the law is "not in accordance
with law."' 97 In either case, the same standard should apply to legal
questions, which are within the particular expertise of courts as in-
terpreters of statutes.
Since Smith-Corona, the Federal Circuit has generally been defer-
ential to agency interpretations of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws. 98 The increasing willingness of the Federal
Circuit to overturn agency interpretations 99 may signal that in the
eleven years since the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979100 and the creation of the Federal Circuit,10 ' the court is more
comfortable with the statutory scheme and the legislative intent, and
more willing to examine critically agency interpretations. Neverthe-
less, the court has not properly distinguished its approach in those
Court of Customs Appeals, United States v. Charles H. Wyman & Co., 156 F. 97 (8th Cir.
1907).
94. 916 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
95. Construction of a tariff term is a question of law. See Eastalco Aluminum Co. v.
United States, 916 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding "[s]tatutory interpretation is a
question oflaw"); Richards Medical, 910 F.2d at 830 (claiming meaning of statutory term "ther-
apeutic" is a question of law); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United States, 748 F.2d 663, 665-67
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (turning to "well-established rules of customs construction" to define term
"bicycle speedometer" where plain meaning was not clear).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1988) (creating presumption that custom's classification is
correct and placing burden of proof on party challenging classification).
97. This is the applicable standard of review in appeals from antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1) (1988) (stating that action "not in accordance
with law" is unlawful). The section provides, in pertinent part: "The Court shall hold unlaw-
ful any determination, finding, or conclusion found ... to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id.
98. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text (discussing deference to agency inter-
pretations of post-Smith-Corona cases such as Consumer Products, American Lamb, Avesta AB, and
Generra Sportswear).
99. See, e.g., Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores v. United States, 916 F.2d 1571,
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting agency reliance on regulation by finding that regulation did
not cover fact situation at issue); U.H.F.C. Co. v. United States, 916 F.2d 689, 701 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (finding that ITA could not use "best information" where fact that information did not
and could not exist was reason party failed to give information); LMI-La Metalli Industriale,
S.P.A. v. United States, 912 F.2d 455, 461 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that "ITA's assess-
ment of a lira-denominated interest rate for the imputed cost of credit" was not supported by
"substantial evidence").
100. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
101. See infra note 103 (providing history of Federal Circuit and its establishment in 1982).
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decisions in which it has continued to defer to agency
interpretations.1 0 2
The foundation for more intrusive review in the interpretation
and application of the international trade laws should be derived
from the specialized nature of the reviewing courts. Since their in-
ception, the international trade laws have been administered by spe-
cialized agencies, including the Customs Service, the ITC, and the
Commerce Department. In 1909, Congress entrusted specialized
tribunals with oversight of these agencies. 03 The Court of Interna-
tional Trade and the Federal Circuit currently perform these over-
sight duties. The national jurisdiction of these courts ensures
uniformity in application of the international trade laws.
When Congress amended the jurisdictional provisions covering
antidumping, countervailing duty, and customs appeals in 1980,104
it was well aware that the courts reviewing these statutes would have
expertise in the area.105 Congress' repeated amendments of the
102. Compare Avesta AB v. United States, 914 F.2d 233, 236-37 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (agreeing
that ITC had discretion to determine whether review investigation should be initiated after
finding that statute contained "less than exacting standards of decision" and that legislative
history indicated some intent to leave discretion to agency) and Generra Sportswear Co. v.
United States, 905 F.2d 377, 378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (concluding that Customs' construction
of statute was permissible where statute did not address question at issue) with Asociacion
Colombiana, 916 F.2d at 1576 (rejecting agency reliance on regulation because it thwarted
purpose of statute) and LMI-La Metalli Industriae, S.P.A. v. United States, 912 F.2d 455, 460-
61 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting ITA's method of imputing credit costs because it did not con-
form with "reasonable commercial behavior").
103. In 1890, Congress created the Board of General Appraisers to resolve customs dis-
putes. Customs Administrative Act, ch. 407, §§ 12-14, 26 Stat. 141, 136-38 (1890). Prior to
1909, appeals arising from the adjudication of customs disputes were heard by the various
circuit courts pursuant to section 15 of the Customs Administrative Act of 1890. In 1909,
Congress created the United States Court of Customs Appeals to hear appeals from the
Board. Payne-Aldrich TariffAct, ch. 6, § 29, 36 Stat. 11, 105-06 (1909). In 1926, Congress
changed the Board into the United States Customs Court, Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 44
Stat. 669, and the Court of Customs Appeals was superseded by the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, established by the Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475,
1475.
In 1980, Congress clarified and expanded the Customs Court's jurisdiction, and changed its
name to the United States Court of International Trade. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 19, at 28 U.S.C.). The
C.C.P.A. was superseded in turn, by the current appellate forum for customs disputes, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, established by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 38 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295).
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from judgments of the United
States Court of International Trade. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1988).
104. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Star. 1727.
105. See S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (noting that CIT would have same
expertise and specialized skills of Customs Court). Congress was also concerned with guaran-
teeing that the CIT would not be unduly influenced in its deliberations by partisan political
considerations. To this end, Congress retained a Customs Court requirement for balanced
political party membership on the court. 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1988) (providing that "[n]ot
more than five of [nine member] judges shall be from the same political party"). Congress
retained this provision because it felt that "the international trade statutes are laden heavily
with differing policy considerations which ought to be reflected in the composition of the
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countervailing duty and antidumping duty laws have emphasized
congressional disapproval of the administration of these laws by the
Treasury and Commerce Departments.' 06 Congress has acted to
speed up the process, to limit the number of appeals that can be
taken by foreign producers and importers, and to ensure that do-
mestic industries injured by unfair trade practices have fair and
timely access to the courts.' 0 7 Given this history, it is apparent that
agency actions should be met with intensive judicial scrutiny, rather
than a deferential approach. Congress depends upon the expertise
of the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade to en-
sure that its intent is achieved.
Moreover, the strict statutory deadlines imposed in unfair trade
investigations and the increasingly apparent efforts of the Com-
merce Department in particular to expedite the review of antidump-
ing and countervailing duty orders create an inherent conflict with
the fundamental rights to full and fair participation. Congress in
1984 and again in 1988 amended the unfair trade laws in varied
ways in order to expedite and streamline proceedings.108 As a re-
tribunal responsible for resolving disputes arising out of the interpretation of those statutes."
H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980).
106. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (report on Omnibus Trade Act of
1987, S. 490, earlier Senate version of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107) (observing that loopholes in antidumping and countervailing
duties laws seriously undermined effectiveness of remedies provided by these laws, thus frus-
trating congressional intent); H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) (report on
Trade Remedies Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 4784, earlier House version of Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948) (noting "enormous costs and procedural
delays" associated with antidumping and countervailing duty laws); S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. 76-77 (1979) (report on Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
93 Stat. 144) (highlighting "dismal performance" of Treasury Department in assessing special
dumping duties); H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1979) (report on Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144) (noting that "[t]he Committee [on Ways
and Means] is very dissatisfied with the past record of the Secretaries of the Treasury in as-
sessing duties on entries subject to a dumping finding").
107. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1979) (explaining that interlocutory
review added to antidumping and countervailing duty procedures to enable parties to obtain
review "at earliest possible opportunity so as to avoid delay"); see id. at 76 (observing that
Senate Finance Committee intended that antidumping duties be collected expeditiously so as
to reduce uncertainty "for both the importer and the domestic industry"); see also Badger-
Powhatan v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (noting that Con-
gress intended to expedite assessment of antidumping duties by requiring deposit of esti-
mated duties).
108. The House Committee on Ways and Means, reporting on the 1984 amendments to
Title VII, indicated that one of the important purposes of the amendments was to "lower legal
costs, simplify investigations for all parties, and greatly reduce the burdens on the agencies
administering these laws." H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5127, 5128. Similarly, the Ways and Means Committee, report-
ing on a predecessor bill to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, indicated
that an important purpose of the Act was "to improve the procedures for providing fair and
timely access to information .... " H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 at 140.
The House Committee also noted that the Act "should provide for a fairer and more efficient
proceeding." Id at 141.
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suit of the authority to use new methodologies, for example, averag-
ing and sampling, 10 9 there will inevitably be pressure on the
Commerce Department to sacrifice some degree of fairness in the
interests of more rapid decisionmaking. 110 Or, given the authority
to accept unverified data, Commerce may reduce its thoroughness
to the detriment of domestic interested parties."' Hence, it is im-
perative that the courts resist this tendency by applying a greater
level of scrutiny to agency determinations made in some cases in the
interests of speed at the expense of accuracy and fairness.
These considerations justify a different judicial review of agency
interpretation and application of the relevant statutes than the gen-
eral maxims adopted in Smith-Corona and employed in subsequent
cases. In customs cases, the Federal Circuit and its predecessors
have invoked a de novo review of statutory language in the tariff
schedules, searching for "plain meaning" in the statute and legisla-
tive history, without deference to the view of the agency." 12 Never-
theless, the Federal Circuit has not explicitly rejected the deferential
standard, nor has it articulated any basis for application of a "rea-
sonableness" inquiry in one case and the substitution of judicial
reckoning for that of the agency in another. Thus, the Court of In-
ternational Trade must guess at which standard to apply whenever it
must fill in the interstices of the statute.
A principled approach relies upon the recognition that the Fed-
eral Circuit and Court of International Trade are "masters of the
subject," at least when it comes to the "quintessential judicial func-
109. The authority of the Commerce Department to use samples and averages in calculat-
ing dumping margins was expanded in 1984. Trade and TariffAct of 1984, § 620(a), 98 Stat.
3039, codified 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (1988). "By permitting the Department to use generally
recognized averaging and sampling techniques ... the Committee seeks to maximize efficient
use of limited staff resources and to expedite processing of individual cases and annual re-
views without loss of reasonable fairness in the results." S. REP. No. 725, at 46.
110. As noted, supra note 109, Congress intended to preserve "reasonable fairness in the
results," S. REP. No. 725, at 46. The statute thus provides that samples and averages must be
"representative" of the transactions undei investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f- I(b) (1988); see
Asociaci6n Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 704 F. Supp. 1114, 1121-
22 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989), af'd, 901 F.2d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding use of monthly
average United States price as "representative").
S111. The 1984 amendments also authorized the Commerce Department to omit verifica-
tion of submitted information, unless verification was timely requested by a party. Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, § 618, 98 Stat. 3037, codified 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). The purpose of the
amendment was to remove "an unnecessary additional administrative burden on the Depart-
ment of Commerce .... S. REP. No. 725, at 43. Yet, Congress recognized that "proper
enforcement" of the law and accurate assessment of duties were best ensured by verification
of information submitted by parties. Id.
112. In a recent decision, the court noted that "[t]he meaning of a particular term... is a
question of law and therefore not entitled to the deference we exercise with respect to fact
questions." Libbey Glass, Inc., v. United States, No. 90-1295, slip. op. at 3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 18,
1990) (citing Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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tion" of statutory interpretation.' 1 3 By explicitly recognizing its
special mandate, the Federal Circuit would signal the Court of Inter-
national Trade in the 1990s to defer less often to agency interpreta-
tion. Of course, to have an effect in an area of the law where
amendments occur every four years and annual reviews threaten to
moot court decisions even before they are made, the Federal Circuit
must expedite its decisions.1 14 This increased attention to the pur-
pose of the statute and greater willingness to examine so-called
"technical" issues may reduce the need to regularly amend the in-
ternational trade laws.
This is not to say that a lack of deference to agency interpretations
in 1990 necessarily produced the correct result in the specific cases
this Article addressed. As reviewed above, specific decisions were at
odds with the language and purpose of the statute or with prior
caselaw. In LMI,115 for example, the court's failure to recognize
that respondents in dumping cases have an incentive to withhold
information and to understate the margin of dumping"16 detracts
from the basis of that decision to measure credit costs by dollar-
denominated loans without proof that such loans were obtained."17
Similarly, in U.H.F.C. Co. v. United States,"18 the same oversight un-
dermines its decision not to permit the Commerce Department to
rely solely on the "best information" available where a party has
failed to give the Department information. 119 Nevertheless, the
court's willingness to overturn the agency, even in a highly technical
area, is a positive development.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit should reclaim this ground as "master" of the
subject in interpreting these unfair trade laws. Congress' reliance
113. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S.
89, 98 n.8 (1983) (holding that interpreting statutes is the "quintessential judicial function").
114. DuringJanuary-November 1990, 27 of the 36 opinions issued concluded cases dock-
eted in 1989. See Shambon, supra note 69, at 10-15 (discussing length of time from docketing
to decision). Moreover, at least one case still on the court's docket in 1991 was docketed in
1988. PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, App. No. 88-1175 (appeal docketed January 15,
1988). Briefing is complete and oral argument was held in this case in June 1988. Subse-
quent to the argument, one of the panelists died. To date the case has not been reargued and
it remains on the court's docket undecided.
115. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing LM).
116. The Federal Circuit relied on precisely this factor in AL Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v.
United States, 745 F.2d 632, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (recognizing "incentive for foreign respon-
dents to present inaccurate or unreliable data" while holding that Commerce Department
must verify foreign manufacturers' information during periodic review of outstanding an-
tidumping duty order).
117. LMI, 912 F.2d at 460-61.
118. U.H.F.C. Co. v. United States, 916 F.2d 689 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
119. Id. at 700-01.
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on specialized courts to oversee the two agencies charged with ad-
ministering a complex law under tight deadlines suggests that the
courts should take a hard look at agency decisions based upon the
superior principles of congressional intent, manifested in the lan-
guage of the statute and the legislative history. Where its 1990 deci-
sions departed from that intent, the Circuit's opinions were flawed.
To the extent, however, that the court rigorously examined the
agencies' application of the law, its decisions are a step in the right
direction. What remains for future opinions is a consistent ap-
proach that ensures ajudicial review of international trade cases that
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